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paper 1 of 21. Introduction
The value of the U.S. stock market relative to gross domestic product (GDP) has varied
and varied a lot. (See Figure 1.1) In the mid-1970s, the value of corporate equity relative to GDP
fell to half of the 1960s average. Starting in the mid-1980s, corporate valuations began to rise. By
2000, the value of corporate equity relative to GDP was nearly twice the 1960s average. After 2000,
equity values fell relative to GDP but remained high relative to the 1960s levels. Stock market
analysts view these dramatic movements as puzzling because there has not been signiﬁcant change
relative to GDP in three key market fundamentals: corporate capital stock, after-tax corporate
earnings, and corporate net debt.
There is another factor that strongly aﬀects the value of corporate equity, however, and
this factor has changed a lot since 1960: a country’s tax and regulatory system. In this study,
we use growth theory to derive the quantitative implications of U.S. tax and regulatory changes
for U.S. corporate valuations, capital-output ratios, and corporate earnings’ share of product. In
particular, we derive a formula for the value of corporate equity plus net debt and evaluate it
using Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data for the capital stocks and Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) data for tax rates. We focus on low-frequency, or secular, movements in aggregate values,
all in relation to the movements in GDP. We ask speciﬁcally whether the theory accounts for the
dramatic secular changes in U.S. corporate valuations and the small changes in U.S. capital-output
ratios and earnings shares. We ﬁnd that it does.
In particular, we ﬁnd that the large decline in the eﬀective marginal tax rate on U.S. cor-
porate distributions accounts for the high value of equities in the late 1990s relative to the 1960s.
There are two reasons for the big decline in this tax rate. First, there were reductions in marginal
income tax rates, with the largest changes beginning in the early 1980s. Second, and more impor-
tantly, there were changes in the legal and regulatory system that led to a dramatic increase in the
share of corporate equity held by entities that pay no tax on dividend or capital gains income. The
percentage of corporate equity held by these entities—namely, pension funds, individual retirement
accounts, and nonproﬁt organizations—increased from 4 percent in 1960 to 51 percent in 2000.
A crucial prediction of the theory we use is that a decline in eﬀective marginal tax rates on
corporate distributions does not aﬀect corporate earnings or capital stocks. This is consistent with
the data. In the United States, while prices of equities doubled between 1960 and 2000, the ratio of
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Figure 1. Value of U.S. Corporations, 1960–2001
corporate capital to GDP and the share of after-tax corporate proﬁts in national income changed
little.
There was an extended period from 1975 through 1985 when the value of corporate equity
was about half of the 1960s average. One contributing factor to these lower equity values was
the substitution of debt-ﬁnancing for equity-ﬁnancing. This swap occurred as personal income tax
rates fell below corporate income tax rates. Another contributing factor was a change in tax policy
that subsidized new capital. Increased use of investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation
allowances led to a fall in the price of capital and thus a fall in the value of equity relative to
corporate capital.
Stock market values began to rise in the mid-1980s because most capital subsidies were
eliminated by the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, individual income tax rates were lowered,
and tax-deferred accounts were increasingly used. The adjustment to a higher value-output ratio
was gradual, taking about 15 years. We ﬁnd that constraints on individuals shifting savings from
nonretirement accounts to retirement accounts result in a long adjustment, with a 15-year transition
being reasonable.
2The United Kingdom is another country that experienced large secular movements in cor-
porate equity values over the post–World War II period, and its movements were even larger than
those in the United States. We ﬁnd that here, as in the United States, changes in tax and regu-
latory policy account for much of the low-frequency variation in corporate valuations during the
1960–2001 period. In the United Kingdom, there were generous subsidies to investment in the
1970s that were signiﬁcantly larger than those in the United States. Shareholders in the United
Kingdom saw their eﬀective tax rates on distributions fall sooner and more dramatically than rates
in the United States. We ﬁnd that these changes account for the pattern and magnitudes of change
of U.K. corporate valuations. As theory predicts, the United Kingdom experienced lower equity
values in the 1970s and an earlier and larger increase in the 1980s and 1990s than we observed in
the United States. As did the United States, the United Kingdom had regulations on corporate
distributions and retirement investments that implied a long transition period for the rise in equity
values.
The literature that looks at movements in equity prices is vast, but there is some work
that, like ours, considers the decline in values in the 1970s and the rise in values in the 1980s and
1990s. Feldstein (1980) shows that a permanent inﬂation can have the eﬀect of lowering the price of
equities if tax rules are like those in place in the United States during the 1970s. We too allow for
inﬂationary eﬀects but ﬁnd the consequences to be small. Another factor that can have an adverse
eﬀect on equity values is the arrival of information technology (IT) which signals an end to old
technologies and a decline in their values. Studies of the IT revolution include those of Greenwood
and Jovanovic (1999), Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001), and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003). Recent work
by Peralta-Alva (2003) considers the quantitative implications of these technology-driven theories
and ﬁnds that a large and persistent decline in the stock market value is necessarily accompanied
by large and counterfactual changes in key macroeconomic aggregates.
Other related work oﬀers explanations for the rise in equity values during the 1990s. Shiller
(2000) suggests that the high value of the U.S. stock market reﬂects “irrational exuberance” among
investors.2 He provides no theoretical justiﬁcation, however, for the claim that the stock market
in 2000 was overvalued. Hall (2001) attributes the rise in the market value of equity to higher
intangible investment during the 1990s. However, Hall’s value of intangible capital is residually
determined as the diﬀerence between the market value of corporate equity and the value of tangible
capital and, therefore, accounts for the run-up in prices by construction. Heaton and Lucas (1999)
3quantify the contribution of increased participation and reduced dividend volatility (proxying for
diversiﬁcation) for stock values and returns. They ﬁnd that observed changes in participation are
too small to generate a large change in stock values. Additionally, reducing dividend volatility does
imply some increase in the price-dividend ratio, but Heaton and Lucas provide no evidence that
such a change is consistent with observations. Abel (2003) explores the idea that higher saving
by baby boomers leads to an increase in the market value relative to GDP. Quantitatively, this
explanation has two diﬃculties. First, Abel’s model cannot generate a value to GDP ratio above
1, when in fact the ratio was 1.6 in 2000. Second, historical variations in investment-output ratios
are simply too small to generate large variations in the model’s prediction for the price of capital.
In Section 2, we present a simple growth model and use it to derive the key relation between
the market value of corporations and the value of productive corporate capital. Then, in Section
3, we relate the result to the U.S. economy. To determine the quantitative predictions of the
theory for U.S. observations, we extend the simple version of the growth model to include features
of the U.S. tax and regulatory codes, and we display the model’s predictions against the actual
U.S. values for measures of corporate value. In Section 4, we use the theory to make predictions
for valuations of U.K. corporations, and compare the U.S. and U.K. results. In Section 5, we
demonstrate that adjustments in corporate valuations can take a long time after tax reforms if
individuals face constraints on reallocating their asset holdings. In Section 6, we summarize our
ﬁndings and discuss issues for future research.
2. Theory
In this section, we present a simple version of the growth model and use it to highlight our key
theoretical results.3 The model economy has a corporate sector, a household sector, and a simple
tax system with taxes on corporate income and distributions and subsidies to capital investment.
With this simple framework, we have all that we need to derive our key formula relating the market
value of the corporations to the value of the productive capital in the corporate sector. We show
how this formula can be interpreted in light of alternative tax and regulatory policies. This will be
helpful when we look at speciﬁc tax and regulatory changes and their eﬀects on the value-output
and capital-output ratios in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Here and later we take as exogenous corporations’ ﬁnancing decision. The theory we use
provides a prediction for the total value of corporations, equity plus net debt. To keep the analysis
4simple, we model the corporation as issuing only equity, but it is straightforward to allow for debt
and to relate the sum of the market values of debt and equity to the value of productive capital.4
We also abstract from uncertainty in pricing equity throughout because our main results are
unchanged by including it. In McGrattan and Prescott (2000), we do allow for uncertainty and
ﬁnd that the premium for risk is very small.
A. The Formula for the Value of Corporations
Consider the following model economy. The economy is inhabited by inﬁnitely lived house-
holds with preferences ordered by
∞  
t=0
βt U(ct,n t) (1)
where t indexes time, c is per-capita consumption, and n is labor supply.5
We use pt to denote the household’s price of period t consumption and it = pt/pt+1 − 1t o
denote the after-tax interest rate. Each household chooses sequences of consumption and labor to
maximize utility subject to its budget constraint,
 
t
pt{ct + vt(st+1 − st)}≤
 
t
pt{(1 − τdist)dtst + wtnt + ψt}. (2)
This constraint says that the present discounted value of expenditures must be less than or equal to
the present discounted value of after-tax income. Expenditures of the household are consumption
and purchases of shares in stocks, vt(st+1−st), where st is the number of shares held at the beginning
of period t and vt is the price per share. Receipts of the households are corporate distributions,
wages, and government transfers. We denote distributions per share by d, the wage rate by w,a n d
government transfers by ψ. The households pay taxes on distributions, at a rate equal to τdist.
Firms have capital and hire labor to produce output with a constant returns-to-scale pro-
duction technology,6
yt = f(km,t,k u,t,z tnt). (3)
This speciﬁcation assumes that ﬁrms use both tangible assets km, which are measured, and intan-
gible assets ku, which are unmeasured. Tangible assets include structures, equipment, inventories,
5and land. Intangible assets include brand names, patents, and forms of organizational capital. In
addition to capital, labor services n are required. The technology parameters, zt, are assumed to
grow at rate γ.
Distributions to the household are equal to what ﬁrms have after paying wages, making new
investments, paying taxes, and receiving subsidies. The distributions are given by
dt =( 1− τcorp)[f(km,t,k u,t,z tnt) − wtnt − δmkm,t − xu,t] − [km,t+1 − km,t]+τsubsxm,t (4)
where xm is new investment in measured tangible capital and xu is new investment in unmeasured
intangible capital. Firms pay taxes on corporate income at rate τcorp and receive subsidies to
tangible investment at rate τsubs. They choose capital and labor to maximize the present value of
distributions net of taxes paid by households on distributions:
∞  
t=0
ptdt(1 − τdist)( 5 )
s.t.k m,t+1 =( 1 − δm)km,t + xm,t (6)
ku,t+1 =( 1 − δu)ku,t + xu,t. (7)
Market-clearing in this economy requires that the labor market clears; the equity market
clears (st = 1); and the goods market clears,
ct + xm,t + xu,t = f(km,t,k u,t,z tnt). (8)
Three equilibrium conditions which we use subsequently are
pt
pt+1
=
vt+1 +( 1− τdist)dt+1
vt
(9)
pt
pt+1
=[ ( 1 − τcorp)(f1(km,t+1,k u,t+1,z t+1nt+1) − δm)+τsubs δm]/(1 − τsubs) + 1 (10)
pt
pt+1
= f2(km,t+1,k u,t+1,z t+1nt+1) − δu +1 . (11)
These three conditions say, among other things, that the returns to stocks and the two types of
capital must be equal.
6Proposition 1. An equilibrium price of corporate equity is
vt =( 1− τdist)[(1− τsubs)km,t+1 +( 1− τcorp)ku,t+1]. (12)
Proof: This follows from the deﬁnition of distributions in (4) and conditions (9)–(11).
The price in (12) is the unique equilibrium price if there are buyers and sellers, as would be
true in an overlapping generations model. It is also the unique equilibrium price for this dynastic
economy if the tax rate on realized capital gains is zero.
The price of tangible capital for the shareholders is (1 − τdist)(1 − τsubs), not 1. The distri-
bution tax aﬀects this price because a dollar reinvested is not taxed, but a dollar distributed is.
Similarly, a subsidy to tangible investment aﬀects this price because it makes investing in tangibles
cheaper.
The price of intangible capital is (1−τdist)(1−τcorp). The price of intangible capital depends
on the corporate distribution tax in the same way and for the same reason as the price of tangible
capital. The price of intangible capital also depends on the corporate income tax rate because
investments in intangible capital are expensed and reduce taxable corporate income.
B. Interpreting the Tax on Distributions
Formula (12) is not the standard formula for the price of corporate equity in the public
ﬁnance literature.7 The standard formula for the price of measured capital, ignoring subsidies to
capital, is (1 − τpers)/(1 − τaecg), where τpers is the personal income tax rate on ordinary income
and τaecg is the accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate. The latter tax rate is computed to yield
the same terminal after-tax wealth as would be made on an investment realizing a capital gain.
(See, for example, Auerbach (1983a).)
In the U.S. tax system, capital gains are taxed upon realization. Thus, the relevant tax
rate for corporate distributions (that is, τdist in equation (12)) is the personal income tax rate
τpers if corporations make distributions to households by paying dividends, and it is the realized
capital gains tax rate τcg if corporations make distributions by buying back shares or liquidating
operations. If a combination of the two is used, the rate will be between these two rates.
If equity is held in tax-deferred retirement accounts, then the appropriate tax on distributions
in (12) is zero even if the contributions are taxed when they are withdrawn. To see why this is true,
7consider an individual investing one dollar in equity funds in a retirement account, which yields a
per-period return of i. The individual gives up (1 − τpers)t o d a yf o r( 1− τpers)(1 + i)k k periods
hence. The tax is eﬀectively a consumption tax and does not aﬀect v. This result will be important
when we consider changes in laws aﬀecting retirement accounts.
C. The Prediction for Value-Output and Capital-Output Ratios
We show here that while the capital-output ratios are aﬀected by the corporate income
tax rate and subsidies to investment, they are not aﬀected by the tax rate on corporate distribu-
tions if changes in tax revenues are exactly oﬀset by transfers. This result will be important for
understanding what has happened in the United States and the United Kingdom in the last 40
years.
Proposition 2. If two economies A and B are identical except that (i) their tax rates on distribu-
tions are not equal, τA
dist  = τB
dist,a n d( ii) the diﬀerence in transfers oﬀsets the diﬀerence in revenues
from distributions, ψA
t − ψB
t = τA
distdA
t sA
t − τB
distdB
t sB
t , then the equilibrium paths of the economies
A and B are the same except for the price of corporate equity, vt.
Proof: The stand-in ﬁrm in the two economies faces the same maximization problem except for
a multiplicative factor in the objective function. Similarly, the budget constraints of households
place the same constraints on consumption and labor supply provided that condition (ii)h o l d s .
By Walras’ law, the government budget constraints will also be satisﬁed in both economies. From
(12), therefore, vA
t /(1 − τA
dist)=vB
t /(1 − τB
dist).
In particular, the ratios of capital to output will not depend on the tax rate on corporate
distributions. It is clear from (10) and (11), however, that they do depend on corporate income
tax rates and investment subsidies.
3. Application to the United States
We now use the theory just described to identify the key policy changes that have aﬀected
U.S. equity markets over the last 40 years. Between 1960 and 2001, there was a large decline in
the eﬀective tax rate on corporate distributions and a modest decline in the tax rate on corporate
income. Using the theory, we would predict that such policy changes would produce a large increase
in the value of U.S. corporate equity relative to GDP between these years with a small increase in
8the corporate capital-output ratios. This is what we observe. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
there were signiﬁcant subsidies for tangible investment—which were then eliminated with the 1986
Tax Reform Act. Using the theory of Section 2, we would predict a large decline in the price of
measured capital and a temporary rise in that stock of capital. Again, this is what we observe. Here
we ask whether or not the predicted magnitudes of the changes roughly match the U.S. experience.
We ﬁnd that they do.
We ﬁrst review the primary tax and regulatory changes that occurred in the United States
between 1960 and 2001 which led to a decline in the eﬀective tax rate on distributions, the temporary
rise in capital subsidies, and the slow transition to higher stock values. We then extend the theory to
include details for the U.S. economy; the extensions are needed to facilitate matching the model with
the data. We show that none of the theoretical results change. Finally, we report our quantitative
ﬁndings.
A. Changes in U.S. Taxes and Regulations
In the 1960–2001 period, there were changes in the tax and regulatory system that had
important eﬀects on the rates τdist, τcorp,a n dτsubs.
Tax rate on corporate distributions
Three changes during the period reduced the tax rate on corporate distributions τdist.F i r s t ,
individual income tax rates fell. Second, strict regulations on ﬁduciaries were relaxed, which led
the fraction of equity held by nontaxed entities to rise. Third, regulations on share repurchases,
which had a tax advantage over dividends, were relaxed.
Between 1964 and 1986, there were three cuts in individual income tax rates. The ﬁrst was
the Revenue Act of 1964, which reduced the highest marginal income tax rate from 91 percent to
70 percent. Next, there was the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, which reduced the
highest rate to 50 percent. Finally, there was the TRA of 1986, which reduced the marginal tax
rate on the highest incomes to 28 percent. These rate reductions implied a drop in marginal rates
paid on dividends, since dividends are taxed as ordinary income.
A second change that aﬀected the tax rate on corporate distributions was a change in the reg-
ulations governing pension funds and retirement accounts, which do not pay tax on distributions.8
9A major change came in 1974 when the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
was enacted. Before this act was passed, there were few guidelines on what constituted imprudent
behavior by ﬁduciaries. Fiduciary breaches were dealt with in the U.S. courts, case by case. During
this early period, pension fund portfolios were primarily debt assets. Fiduciaries managing pension
funds chose not to hold equity because of the risk of being sued if the value of equity fell.
With the enactment of ERISA, pension funds became regulated intermediaries, and uniform
ﬁduciary standards were established. The standards pertaining to prudent behavior by ﬁduciaries
were further clariﬁed in 1979 by the U.S. Department of Labor (Section 404(a)(1) of Rules and
Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility). If a ﬁduciary complied with the prudence regulation,
the investments made were deemed prudent, and the ﬁduciary was not held to be personally liable.
During the period following these legal changes, pension fund equity holdings increased signiﬁcantly,
and the eﬀective tax on distributions declined signiﬁcantly.
Changes in tax law also led to a rise in nontaxed retirement accounts. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s, there were major changes in tax law that fostered individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) and deﬁned contribution pension plans. The funds in these retirement plans are invested in
individual accounts, with the individual typically having considerable latitude in how these funds
will be invested. A consequence of these tax law changes is that equity holdings in these plans grew
rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s. The percentage of corporate equity held by all nontaxed entities—
namely, pension funds, individual retirement accounts, and nonproﬁt organizations—increased from
4 percent in 1960 to 51 percent in 2000. With more equity in nontaxed or tax-deferred accounts,
the eﬀective tax rate on corporate distributions is lower.
A third change that aﬀected the tax rate on distributions was a change in regulations gov-
erning share repurchases. The 1954 Internal Revenue Code (Section 302) states that buybacks that
are “substantially disproportionate” are taxed at the capital gains rate, which for most years since
1960 was lower than the ordinary rate used for dividend income. (See Bittker and Eustice (2000),
Chapter 9.) In spite of this provision, buybacks were little used as a means to make distributions
of earnings to stockholders prior to 1977. In that year, IBM became the ﬁrst major corporation
to make distributions via buybacks with a $1.4 billion repurchase of its shares. The fact that this
buyback was treated as a capital gain set a precedent. Publicly traded corporations no longer had
to worry that market repurchases would be treated as dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002)
examine data for all the corporations in the Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database for the
10period 1972–2000. They report that buybacks increased from under 5 percent of total distributions
in 1977 to over 50 percent in 2000.9
Most of the increase in repurchases actually occurred after 1997. Prior to that, SEC and IRS
rules gave little, if any, incentive for companies to buy back shares. Under the rules in place prior to
1982, the SEC could and often did charge companies with illegally manipulating their stock prices
during stock repurchase programs. (See sections 9 and 10 of the Security Exchange Act of 1934.) In
1982, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-18, which essentially provided a safe harbor for buybacks. Rule
10b-18 gives speciﬁc guidelines to companies and brokers for repurchase programs.10 With the
1986 TRA, the diﬀerence in the tax rate on capital gains and dividends virtually disappeared and,
therefore, so did the incentive for buybacks. In 1991, the law was changed again, and the maximum
rate on capital gains dropped below the maximum rate on ordinary income. The diﬀerence, however,
was small. Not until 1997, when the rate on long-term capital gains was lowered to 20 percent did
buybacks increase signiﬁcantly. (See Grullon and Michaely (2002).)
In McGrattan and Prescott (2003b), we document that the eﬀective tax rate on dividend
distributions averaged 41 percent in the period 1960–69 and 17 percent in the period 1990–2001.11
In the earlier period, the tax rate on dividends is the relevant tax rate for corporate distributions
because of the restrictions on share buybacks. In the later period, distributions were made through
dividends and share repurchases, but we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in eﬀective tax rates for dividends
and capital gains from share repurchases are quantitatively small. (See McGrattan and Prescott
(2003b).) Thus, we use our estimate for the tax rate on dividends for τdist in our later calculations.
Tax rate on corporate income
A second tax that aﬀects the value of corporate equity is the income tax rate on corpora-
tions τcorp. The corporate income tax rate has fallen over the period 1960–2001, but much less
dramatically than the tax rate on corporate distributions.
We measure the corporate income tax rate as the ratio of the corporate proﬁts tax liability
in the U.S. national income and product accounts (NIPA) to before-tax corporate proﬁts. In calcu-
lating the tax rate, we do not include the Federal Reserve Banks’ taxes and proﬁts. We eliminate
the Federal Reserve Banks because essentially all of their proﬁts are given to the U.S. Treasury,
and their tax rate is therefore 100 percent.
11Our measure of the corporate income tax includes federal, state, and local proﬁts tax ac-
cruals. Total proﬁts tax liabilities have fallen, but by less than federal tax reports would indicate.
Over time, there has been a rise in the state and local proﬁts tax accruals relative to federal tax
accruals.
We estimate an average U.S. corporate income tax rate in the period 1960–69 of 43 percent.
In the period 1990–2001, our estimate is 35 percent. This is a much less dramatic decline than that
for the tax rate on corporate distributions, which fell from 41 percent on average to 17 percent—to
just half the current corporate income tax rate. If we do not exclude the Federal Reserve Banks,
the average corporate income tax rate in the periods 1960–69 and 1990–2001 are 44 percent and
38 percent, respectively.
Subsidies to capital investment
U.S. capital subsidies were negligible in the 1960s and subsequent to the 1986 Tax Reform
Act. They became signiﬁcant in the 1970s and large in the 1981–86 period. The two important
forms of subsidies were investment tax credits for the purchase of new capital goods and allowed
depreciation in excess of economic depreciation.
Investment tax credits were introduced in 1962, repealed in 1969, reintroduced in 1971, and
eliminated in 1986. These credits were small relative to corporate investment except in the late
1970s and early 1980s, when they were about 6 percent of total corporate investment.
Depreciation allowances in excess of economic depreciation is another form of investment
subsidy. Throughout the 1960–81 period, the IRS shortened what it refers to as the “useful lives”
of capital goods. This shortening increased the rate at which capital could be depreciated for tax
purposes. If we use the data in King and Fullerton (1984) for their 34 categories of investment
goods, we estimate that the average useful lives of capital goods was reduced by a factor of 1.54 in
the 1960s, by a factor of 1.15 in the 1970s, and by a factor of 2.20 (as a result of ERTA) in 1981.12
B. Model of the U.S. Economy
To quantify the eﬀects of particular U.S. tax and regulatory policy changes, we need to
extend the original model to include details relevant to the U.S. economy. First, we allow for two
sectors, corporate and noncorporate.13 Even though our primary focus is on corporate equity, the
12corporate sector accounts for less than 60 percent of U.S. value-added and has only one-third of all
tangible assets. Second, we include the primary sources of U.S. tax revenues: taxes on consumption,
taxes on labor income, taxes on corporate distributions, taxes on corporate income, and taxes on
property. We will show that the basic corporate equity pricing formula, equation (12), does not
change for this more general model economy. We will also show that capital-output ratios are not
aﬀected by changes in the tax rate on corporate distributions, as we found before.
We start with a description of preferences and technologies. The population in period t is
denoted by Nt and grows at rate η,s oNt+1 =( 1+η)Nt. The stand-in household’s preferences are
ordered by
∞  
t=0
βtU(ct,n t)Nt (13)
where c and n are per-capita consumption and labor supply, respectively. The corporate sector is
denoted by 1 and the noncorporate sector by 2. The tangible capital inputs are measured and are
denoted by kjm for sector j. The intangible capital input in sector 1 is not measured and is denoted
by k1u. Note, sector 2 has no intangible capital input. The motivation for this abstraction is that
research and development (R&D) takes place in the pharmaceutical company but not at the corner
drugstore.
The output of sector j is denoted by yj. Sector outputs are combined to produce a composite
good which is used for either private consumption or government consumption or for one of the
categories of investment,
ct + gt + x1m,t + x1u,t + x2m,t ≤ yt = F(y1,t,y 2,t) (14)
where g is government consumption, xjm is gross investment in measured tangible capital in sector
j,a n dx1u is gross investment in unmeasured intangible capital in sector 1.
The technology of sector 1 is described by
y1,t ≤ fc(k1m,t,k 1u,t,z tn1,t) (15)
k1m,t+1 =[ ( 1 − δ1m)k1m,t + x1m,t]/(1 + η) (16)
k1u,t+1 =[ ( 1 − δ1u)k1u,t + x1u,t]/(1 + η). (17)
13Similarly,
y2,t ≤ fnc(k2m,t,z tn2,t) (18)
k2m,t+1 =[ ( 1 − δ2m)k2m,t + x2m,t]/(1 + η). (19)
All technologies have constant returns to scale. In (15) and (18), nj is labor services in sector j and
the {zt} are technology parameters that grow at rate γ. The right sides of the capital accumulation
equations are divided by the growth in population (1 + η) because stocks and investments are in
per-capita units.
We now introduce taxes and regulations. Households pay taxes on consumption at rate τc,
corporate distributions received at rate τd, interest income at rate τb, and labor income at rate τn.
The constraints of the household are the budget constraint,14
∞  
t=0
pt{(1 + τc)ct + v1s,t(s1,t+1 − s1,t)+v2s,t(s2,t+1 − s2,t)+bt+1 − bt}
≤
∞  
t=0
pt{(1 − τd)d1,ts1,t + d2,ts2,t +( 1− τb)rb,tbt +( 1− τn)wtnt + ψt}. (20)
The values of shares held in corporate and noncorporate ﬁrms are v1s,ts1,t and v2s,ts2,t, respectively,
where v is the price and s is the number of shares held. The total number of shares outstanding
is normalized to 1 in each sector. Government bonds are also held and denoted by b.T h ei n t e r e s t
rate earned on these bonds is rb. Transfers of the government are denoted by ψ.
The distributions paid to households are equal to what ﬁrms have after paying wages, making
new investments, paying taxes, and receiving subsidies:
d1,t =(1− τ1)[p1,ty1,t−wtn1,t−τ1kk1m,t−x1u,t]−(1−τx)x1m,t+τ1ˆ δ1mˆ k1m,t+τ1ˆ δ1xx1m,t (21)
d2,t =(1− τ2)[p2,ty2,t−wtn2,t−τ2kk2m,t]−(1−τx)x2,t+τ2ˆ δ2mˆ k2m,t+τ2ˆ δ2xx2m,t (22)
where τj is the tax rate on income in sector j, τjk is the tax rate on property in sector j, τx is
the investment tax credit, pj is the price of goods in sector j,a n dw is the wage rate. The allowed
rate of depreciation on tangible capital in sector j is ˆ δjm. This rate is applied to the book value of
14tangible capital denoted by ˆ kjm,t. The allowed rate of immediate expensing of investment in sector
j is ˆ δjx.
In equilibrium, ﬁrms in the corporate sector choose capital and labor to solve
max
∞  
t=0
ptd1,t(1 − τd) (23)
subject to technology constraints (15)–(17) and the law of motion governing the book value of
tangible capital
ˆ k1m,t+1 =[ ( 1− ˆ δ1m)ˆ k1m,t +( 1− ˆ δ1x)x1m,t]/[(1 + η)(1 + π)]. (24)
The right side of (24) is divided by (1 + η) because units are per capita and by the gross inﬂation
rate, (1 + π), because units are in real terms. Noncorporate ﬁrms solve a similar problem
max
∞  
t=0
ptd2,t (25)
subject to technology constraints (18)–(19) and a constraint analogous to (24).
Government production is included in the noncorporate sector. Government purchases and
transfers are ﬁnanced by tax receipts and debt issues. The period t government budget constraint
must be satisﬁed each period and is given by
gt + ψt + rb,tbt ≤ bt+1 − bt + all tax receipts. (26)
Note that all tax rates are constant and proportional in our model economy.
We now show that the taxes on consumption, labor, property, and interest do not aﬀect the
corporate equity value.
Proposition 3. On a balanced-growth path, the total value of corporate equity, Vt ≡ v1s,tNt,
satisﬁes
Vt =( 1− τd)[(1− τx − τδ)K1m,t+1 +( 1− τ1)K1u,t+1] (27)
where capital letters denote aggregates and, with second-order terms dropped,
τδ = τ1

ˆ δ1x +( 1− ˆ δ1x)


ˆ δ1m
 
(1 − δ1m)(1 + π) − 1+ˆ δ1m
 
(i + π + ˆ δ1m)(γ + η + π + ˆ δ1m)



. (28)
15Here i is the real interest rate.
Proof: See the appendix.
This proposition says that the formula for the equity value is the same as (12), but with
τdist = τd, τsubs = τx + τδ,a n dτcorp = τ1.
In the original model, we were not speciﬁc about the capital subsidies. For the United States,
the primary capital subsidies that have been used are the investment tax credit and accelerated
depreciation allowances. The two extreme cases for accelerated depreciation allowances will turn
out to be of interest. The ﬁrst case is that of immediate expensing, with ˆ δ1x = 1. In this case, all
tangible investment is expensed, so τδ = τ1. The second case is that of no accelerated depreciation,
with the book value of tangible capital equal to the market value of tangible capital. In this second
case, τδ =0 .
For this more general economy, we have the same result as our Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. If two economies A and B are identical except that (i) their tax rates on distribu-
tions are not equal, τA
d  = τB
d ,a n d( ii) the diﬀerence in transfers oﬀsets the diﬀerence in revenues
from distributions, ψA
t − ψB
t = τA
d dA
1,tsA
1,t − τB
d dB
1,tsB
1,t, then the equilibrium paths of the economies
A and B are the same except for the price of corporate equity, Vt.
Proof: The proof is the same as that for Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 says that a change in the tax rate on dividend income aﬀects only the price
of corporate equity and nothing else. This will be important when we consider the U.S. data
because there was little change in U.S. capital-output ratios at the same time that there were large
changes in the value-output ratio. This proposition suggests that the tax rate on distributions was
a potentially important factor.
Our model economy is closed. However, U.S. corporations have operations and, therefore,
capital abroad, and their equity values will reﬂect that. For this reason, we work with the following
modiﬁcation of (27):
Vt =( 1− τd)
 
(1 − τx − τδ)K1m,t+1 +( 1− τ1)K1u,t+1 + K∗
t+1
 
(29)
where K∗ is the value of the foreign capital after income taxes and subsidies.
16Table 1. U.S. Tax Rates and Credits Across and Within Periods
1960-69 1990-2001
Tax on Corporate Income
End of period 45.0 34.9
Average for period 43.2 35.3
Tax on Corporate Distributionsa
End of period 41.8 17.3
Average for period 41.1 17.4
Investment Tax Credit
End of period 2.2 0.0
Average for period 2.0 0.0
aThese estimates are based on data through 2000.
C. Predictions of Theory
We now apply formula (29), using estimates of U.S. tax rates and capital stocks, and de-
rive the quantitative predictions of the growth model described above. We compare periods with
diﬀerent tax and regulatory policies and quantify the eﬀects of changes in policy for changes in
corporate valuations.
We ﬁnd that theory predicts the data well. We start with a comparison of the 1960s and late
1990s–early 2000s and show that the large decline in the eﬀective marginal tax rate on corporate
distributions is a quantitatively important factor for the rise in equity values between the 1960s
and 2000. We then compare the 1960s with the late 1970s–early 1980s and show that higher capital
subsidies are a major factor for the low equities in the 1970s relative to the 1960s.
The rise in equity values between 1960 and 2001
We start with the dramatic diﬀerence between equity values in the 1960s and the late 1990s–
early 2000s. To apply the formula (29), we need values for tax rates and capital stocks in these
periods.
Table 1 reports the U.S. tax rates used in the evaluation.15 As Table 1 shows, average rates
17and end-of-period rates are about the same during the two periods, which is not surprising because
tax policy changed little within these periods. We take this a step further and assume that people
expected the policies to continue into the future.
The empirical counterpart of our model’s measured corporate capital K1m is the sum of the
BEA’s estimate of ﬁxed corporate capital stocks and inventory stocks and the IRS’s estimate of
the value of corporate-owned land. The value of the measured corporate capital stock is close to
one GDP in both periods. It was above one in the late 1970s and early 1980s when subsidies for
new capital were in place.
The value of the stock of intangible capital is not measured by the BEA and must be
estimated. We take an indirect approach, using observations on corporate proﬁts and returns to
tangible assets to estimate a return to intangible assets. An assumption of equal after-tax returns
to tangible and intangible assets allows us to infer the stock of intangible capital.
Observed corporate proﬁts are the sum of contributions from tangible investments plus
intangible investments. More speciﬁcally, we write NIPA proﬁts, before corporate taxes are paid,
as follows when we assume no accelerated depreciation allowances:
NIPA proﬁt in t = p1,ty1,t − wtn1,t − δ1mk1m,t − τ1kk1m,t − x1u,t (30)
=
i
(1 − τ1)(γ + η + δ1m)
x1m,t +( i − γ − η)k1u,t. (31)
In writing (31), we have assumed constant levels of the real interest rate (i), the growth rates of
labor-augmenting technological change (γ), and the growth rates of population (η).
The ﬁrst term in (31) is the contribution from tangible investments, and the second is the
contribution from intangible investments. An assumption in deriving this relation is that returns
across asset types are equated. We residually derive k1u,t with a measure of corporate proﬁts from
NIPA, tangible corporate investment x1m,t, the real interest rate i, the corporate tax rate τ1,a n d
growth rates of technology and population. Note that this calculation does not require knowledge
of the rate of depreciation of intangible capital.
Table 2 reports our estimates of intangible capital for the United States over the periods
1960–69 and 1990–2001. The estimates for the corporate tax rate are taken from Table 1. Real
18Table 2. Estimating Intangible U.S. Capital
1960–69 1990–2001
U.S. Values
Corporate tax rate (τ1) .450 .349
Growth of real GDP (γ + η) .040 .030
Real interest rate (i) .051 .041
Tangible depreciation rate (δ1m) .042 .067
Average corporate investmenta (x1m) .082 .097
Contributions to domestic pre-tax proﬁtsa
Tangible assets [ix 1m/[(1 − τ1)(γ + η + δ1m)]] .093 .063
Intangible assets [(i − γ − η)k1u] .008 .007
Total .101 .070
Estimate of intangible capitala (k1u) .714 .650
aThese values are relative to the value of gross domestic product.
growth rates for GDP are the sum of growth in technology and growth in population. Growth in
technology was about one percentage point higher in the 1960s than in 1990–2001; we assume 3
percent in the 1960s and 2 percent in 1990–2001. Population growth rates for the 20–64 working
age population are comparable in the two periods, at roughly 1 percent.
With log preferences, the real interest rate is equal to [(1+γ)/β]−1, where γ is the growth
rate of the technology parameter and β is the discount factor. We set β equal to 0.98 for both
periods, which implies a real interest rate of 5.1 percent in the 1960s and 4.1 percent in the 1990s.16
Measures of corporate investment are taken from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds
Accounts.17 The depreciation rates of measured corporate investment along with the growth rates
and average investment rates imply corporate measured capital stocks equal to one GDP.
Given the rates at the top of Table 2, we estimate the contributions of tangible and intangible
assets to domestic pre-tax proﬁts. For the 1960s, we ﬁnd that 92 percent of domestic pre-tax
corporate proﬁts is the contribution from tangible assets. For the 1990s, we ﬁnd a similar result
at 90 percent. Inferring the stock of intangible capital using formula (31), we ﬁnd that it is 0.714
19GDP in the 1960s and 0.650 GDP in the 1990s.
Our estimates of intangible capital are in the range of those found in the literature.18 Corrado
et al. (forthcoming) estimate that intangible investments not included in the NIPA are between 4.4
and 10.6 percent of GDP for the period 1998–2000. The lower end of this range is the sum of direct
measures of R&D investments, advertising costs, and copyright and license costs; the upper end of
the range is the sum of these direct measures plus indirect measures of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
investments and costs of organizational change and development.
Unlike our method, a depreciation rate is needed in order to infer the magnitude of intangible
capital stock from Corrado et al.’s estimate of intangible investment. The BEA estimates a rate of
depreciation of 11 percent for R&D investment. If we use this estimate for the depreciation rate of
all intangible stocks included in Corrado et al.’s measure, then the implied range of the intangible
capital stock k1u is from 0.31 to 0.76 GDP. We think an 11 percent depreciation rate is on the high
side for most of non-R&D intangible capital investment. We also think that their estimate of what
Prescott and Visscher (1980) call organization capital investment is conservative. Evidence for this
view is the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc learning-by-doing and the diﬃculty that competitors have
in reducing their costs to the level of the most eﬃcient ﬁrms in the industry. (See Arrow (1962)
and Irwin and Klenow (1994).) This evidence and the direct measures of Corrado et al. suggest
that a reasonable range for the value of intangible capital is between 0.5 and 1.0 GDP.
The fact that our estimates of intangible capital in Table 2 are of similar magnitude in the
1960s and 1990s is also consistent with evidence on directly measured intangibles. According to
surveys of the National Science Foundation (1953–2002), the amount of R&D performed by the
industrial sector was as large in the 1960s as in the 1990s, roughly 1.9 percent of GDP. According to
data of the media agency Universal McCann (1929–2000), advertising expenditures as a percentage
of GDP averaged 2.1 percent in the 1960s and 2.2 percent in the 1990s.
We now apply formula (29) to estimate U.S. corporate equity values and price-earnings
ratios. Table 3 summarizes our main ﬁndings for the 1960s and for the late 1990s and early
2000s.19 Theory’s prediction for the total value of U.S. corporations in the 1960s is 0.877 GDP.
The actual value of equity was 0.898 GDP. Adding the value of net corporate debt of 0.071 GDP
implies a total market value of 0.970 GDP.20 Theory’s prediction for the value of U.S. corporations
in the later period was 1.567 GDP, whereas the actual value of equity plus net debt was on average
20Table 3. Predicted and Actual U.S. Corporate Values
1960–69 1998–2001
Predicted Fundamental Valuesa
Domestic tangible capital .563 .838
Domestic intangible capital .229 .350
Foreign capital .086 .379
Total Relative to GDP .877 1.567
Total Relative to Earningsb (P/E) 13.5 27.5
Actual Market Valuesa
Corporate equities .898 1.576
Net corporate debt .071 .033
Total Relative to GDP .970 1.609
Total Relative to Earningsb (P/E) 14.9 28.2
aAll values are relative to GDP except the price-earnings ratio.
bEarnings are after-tax national corporate proﬁts reported in the NIPA.
1.609 GDP.
Table 3 also reports the predicted contributions from the three types of capital: tangible,
intangible, and foreign. The contribution from tangible capital is found by multiplying its price
(1−τd)(1−τx) and its reproducible cost k1m. The price was 0.57 in 1960–69 and 0.83 in 1998–2001
while the average reproducible cost reported by the BEA was roughly the same in the two periods:
0.99 GDP in 1960–69 and 1.03 GDP in 1998–2001.
For the contribution of intangible capital, we multiply the price of intangible capital (1 −
τd)(1 − τ1) by the cost of the reproducible capital k1u. The price was 0.32 in 1960–69 and 0.54 in
1998–2001, while the average reproducible costs reported in Table 2 fell slightly, from 0.71 GDP in
1960–69 to 0.65 GDP in 1998–2001.
The last category of capital listed in Table 3 is foreign capital. The BEA estimates tangible
capital located in the United States. Thus, we have no direct measures of tangible or intangible
capital used by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. We estimate the value of the stock of
foreign capital by assuming that the ratio of domestic stocks to foreign subsidiary stocks is equal to
21the ratio of domestic corporate proﬁts to foreign subsidiary corporate proﬁts. Doing this produces
an estimate of foreign capital of 0.086 in the period 1960–69 and 0.379 in 1998–2001.21
Also reported in Table 3 is the predicted price-earnings ratio for the two periods. In our
calculations, we use the total value for the numerator and the after-tax national corporate proﬁts
for the denominator. The model’s price-earnings ratio is 13.5 in the 1960s and 27.5 in the recent
period. These estimates are very close to the actual ratios of 14.9 and 28.2, respectively. They
are also close to estimates of Campbell and Shiller (2001), who look at only equities of the 500
companies in the Standard & Poor’s composite index.
Quantitatively, the most important change over the postwar period was the decline in the
U.S. tax rate on corporate distributions. If the rate had remained at 41.8 percent, our prediction
for the value of U.S. corporations in 1998–2001 would have been 1.1 GDP rather than 1.57 GDP.
Also important was the increase in foreign capital.
Hall (2001) has argued that a rise in the stock of intangible capital accounts for the large
increase in equity prices. He, however, does not estimate intangible capital, so it is impossible to
evaluate his argument. We ﬁnd that the value of intangible capital did rise—because its price fell.
But the increase in the value of intangibles accounts for a change in the value of corporate equities
of only 0.12 GDP.
Our main results are not sensitive to errors in measuring the intangible capital stock because
the cost to the household of this stock is much less than its reproducible cost. These costs are
diﬀerent because investments in intangible capital can be ﬁnanced using retained earnings and
because these investments are expensed. For example, even if there were an error of 0.3 of GDP in
measuring this stock, the change in our predicted values would only be 10 percent in both periods.
Our estimate for the total fundamental value in the period 1998–2001 changes only slightly
if we allow for the fact that half of the distributions in 2000 were made through share repurchases.
In McGrattan and Prescott (2003b), we demonstrate that the eﬀective tax rate on dividends is
not very diﬀerent from the eﬀective tax rate on buybacks even in the extreme case in which we
assume that (i) all repurchases are taxed like long-term gains and (ii) the real gains are equal to
the nominal gains. In this extreme case, the eﬀective tax rate on distributions in year 2000 is 14.2
percent, and the prediction for the total fundamental value is 1.626 GDP, which is close to the
predicted and actual values reported in Table 3.
22The overall message of Table 3 is that changes in taxation, especially taxation of corporate
distributions, are an important factor behind the rise in the value of U.S. corporations between the
1960s and the late 1990s and early 2000s.
The low equity values in the 1970s
Before U.S. equity values began their ascent in the late 1980s, they declined dramatically
starting in 1973, when the value of corporate equity relative to GDP fell roughly in half. In
this section, we explore three factors that account in large part for the low equity values after
1973. First, there was some swapping of debt-ﬁnancing for equity-ﬁnancing. Second, tax subsidies
were introduced in the United States that lowered the price of tangible capital. Third, many
European countries had instituted extremely generous capital subsidies, which may well have led
to expectations of similar subsidies in the United States.
One reason for the low corporate valuations in the 1970s was the substitution of debt for
equity as personal income tax rates fell below corporate income tax rates. The average value of net
corporate debt was 0.071 GDP in the 1960s. (See Table 3.) In the period 1973–79, the average was
0.179 GDP, more than double the 1960s level. Thus, although equity values fell by half, the fall in
total corporate valuations was not as large, with the average at 0.970 GDP in the 1960s and 0.664
GDP in 1973–79.
Another reason for the low corporate valuations in the 1970s was the introduction of tax
policies that lowered the price of new capital. We explore two such policies in the context of
our model: investment tax credits and historic cost depreciation allowances in excess of economic
depreciation. As Proposition 3 states, both policies depress corporate valuations.
A good measure of the eﬀective credit on investment, τx, is the ratio of total investment
tax credits to total corporate gross investment, both available in the NIPA. Investment tax credits
relative to corporate investment went from 2 percent in the 1960s to almost 6 percent in the
period 1975–81. Credits were limited to certain types of investment, but there may well have been
expectations of broader application of these credits.
The larger change in policy was the near tripling of the rate at which capital could be
depreciated for tax purposes. We estimate that the consequence of this policy change was to increase
τδ from near 0 to 0.18. Our estimate of 0.18 is based on average values for the U.S. economy in the
23second half of the 1970s. In our formula (28), we set τ1 =0 .38, δ1m =0 .055, i =0 .041, γ+η =0 .03,
π =0 .07, ˆ δ1m =0 .17, and ˆ δ1x = ˆ δ1m/2. We assumed that ˆ δ1x = ˆ δ1m/2, because this implies that
in the year of investment, the depreciation allowance is half of that in subsequent years.22
To summarize, subsidies to new capital investment, τx+τδ, increased by about 22 percentage
points.23 If this were the only change that occurred in the 1970s, then our prediction for the total
value of U.S. corporations would be 0.738 GDP, 11 percent higher than the actual market value.
Another way to quantify the eﬀect of the change in tax subsidies is to compare the predicted
and actual diﬀerences in corporate valuations between the 1960s and 1970s. Again, assuming only
a change in the total subsidy (τx + τδ), the model can account for about half of the diﬀerence
between the 1960s and 1970s average valuation relative to GDP. The actual value for the 1960s
averaged 0.970 GDP, and was 31.5 percent lower in the second half of the 1970s. The predicted
value for the 1960s averaged 0.877 GDP, and was 15.8 percent lower with our estimate of the higher
U.S. subsidy rate.
To fully account for the eﬀects of changes in policy during the 1970s requires modeling
expectations of market participants and taking into account much more generous policies in Europe.
The calculation above assumes that participants expected no further increase in subsidies. If
they expected more generous tax allowances, similar to those already adopted in Europe, then
market values could have fallen further even if the measures were never adopted. If, for example,
U.S. companies expected policies like those in the United Kingdom which allowed for immediate
expensing on most investment goods, they might delay their investments and take advantage of a
subsidy equal to the rate of corporate income tax (that is, τδ = τ1). In this case, the formula (29)
has to be modiﬁed to include a multiplier associated with the constraint imposing nonnegativity
on investment. When the constraint binds, the equity value falls by more than the right side of
equation (29).
In summary, we ﬁnd that increased tax subsidies are a quantitatively important factor for
the low corporate valuations in the 1970s, accounting for about half of the diﬀerence in corporate
valuations between the 1960s and 1970s. Expectations of future increases in subsidies, to levels
allowed in Europe, can further depress stock prices and may account for some of the deviation
between actual and predicted valuations.
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Figure 2. Value of U.S. and U.K. Corporate Equities, 1960–2001
4. Application to the United Kingdom
We turn now to the movements in U.K. corporate valuations over the period 1960–2001.
The patterns of U.S. and U.K. equity values are similar, with a large decline in the 1970s and a
large run-up in the 1980s and 1990s. (See Figure 2.24) What distinguishes the patterns are the
magnitudes of the changes in values. The decline and increase are signiﬁcantly larger in the United
Kingdom. In this section, we determine whether the movements in U.K. corporate equity values
during 1960–2001 are accounted for by changes in the key fundamental factors we have identiﬁed
for the movements in U.S. valuations: corporate net debt, the corporate capital stock, and the tax
and regulatory policies facing corporations. We ﬁnd some change in all of these factors, but the
quantitatively important factor is the U.K. tax and regulatory system.
A. Changes in U.K. Taxes and Regulations
We begin with a review of changes in U.K. policies that aﬀected the tax rate on distributions,
the tax rate on corporate income, and subsidies to corporate investment during 1960–2001.
25Tax rate on corporate distributions
In the period 1958–65 and since 1973, the United Kingdom has had a partial imputation
system. Under an imputation system, the taxes paid by corporations are taken into account when
calculating shareholders’ personal income taxes. Suppose, for example, that a U.K. company were
to pay a dividend. It ﬁrst computes the gross dividend, which is the sum of the distribution plus a
tax credit to be used by shareholders as credit toward their personal tax liability. For most years,
a shareholder with marginal rates equal to the basic rate of income tax received credits that were
just suﬃcient to cover the personal tax liability. A shareholder in a higher bracket received credits
that partially oﬀset the liability. And, until 1997, tax-exempt institutions received tax credits even
though they had no tax liability.
Poterba and Summers (1984) estimate eﬀective U.K. tax rates on dividend income for the
period 1955–81. They estimate a tax rate of 42 percent for 1972, the year before the reintroduction
of the partial imputation system. By 1976, their estimated tax rate falls below zero because of
the large number of nontaxed equity holdings. Poterba and Summers estimate an eﬀective tax
rate for 1981 of minus 12.1 percent. Using the same procedure and data from the U.K. Inland
Revenue Statistics, we estimate rates after 1981 and ﬁnd that they remain negative until 1997.
(See McGrattan and Prescott (2003b).)
With the tax advantages that U.K. pension funds received for dividend income, fund holdings
of equities grew signiﬁcantly. Using data from the U.K. Share Ownership survey in 1969, we estimate
that the domestic holding of equity (once we net out intercorporate holdings) in pensions was 19
percent. By 1993, pensions and individual retirement accounts accounted for 50 percent of domestic
equity holdings. The share fell after that, but by 2001 was still 43 percent.
There have been two changes in U.K. law that account for the recent decline in pension
holdings. First, in 1993, the tax credit was no longer equal to the basic rate of income tax, but
was set equal to the lower rate of income tax. Second, after 1997, tax-exempt institutions could no
longer claim the dividend tax credit.
The eﬀective tax rate on dividends that we compute assumes that U.K. companies could fully
take advantage of the imputation system in place after 1973. This was not always so. Companies
were required to pay an advance corporation tax (ACT) which was used by U.K. Inland Revenue
to ﬁnance the dividend tax credits. When corporate taxes came due, companies could subtract
26what they had paid in ACT from the total tax bill. If the ACT payments exceeded the total due,
then they were in a surplus ACT position. Bond et al. (1996) estimate that in 1981 nearly half of
all U.K. companies were in a surplus ACT position, and 37 percent had made tax payments that
were in fact irrecoverable. In this situation, the U.K. corporate tax system is more like that of the
United States, which has no imputation system. This is relevant for the computation of tax rates
because it implies a higher eﬀective rate on dividends. Bond et al.’s estimates show that this is
large for the latter half of the 1970s and the 1980s. By 1990, fewer than 10 percent of companies
were in a surplus ACT position.
Thus far we have considered only distributions through dividends. Because of U.K. laws,
share repurchases have been a very small fraction of corporate distributions over most of the period
we study. According to Shirley (1997), not until the early 1980s were companies permitted to
repurchase their own shares. But until 1997, pension funds preferred dividends to open market
share buybacks because of the tax credits they received. With the elimination of tax credits for
tax-exempt institutions, there has been an increase in share repurchases, but according to Oﬃce
for National Statistics data, they are still a small part of corporate distributions. (See Hill and
Taylor (2001).)
To summarize, the U.K. corporate tax system had a number of changes that led to a large
decline in eﬀective tax rates on corporate distributions. The decline in rates was even greater than
that for the United States. In McGrattan and Prescott (2003b), we document that the eﬀective
U.K. tax rate on dividend distributions averaged 49.1 percent in the period 1960–69 and minus
5.3 percent in the period 1990–2001. In most years of our sample, the tax rate on dividends is the
relevant tax rate for corporate distributions because of the restrictions on share repurchases or the
tax advantages of dividends. In the future, share buy-backs may increase since pension funds no
longer receive dividend tax credits, but they are still a small part of corporate distributions. Thus,
for our purposes, the relevant rate for τdist in later U.K. calculations is the tax rate on dividends.
Tax rate on corporate income
During the post-WWII period, corporate income tax rates in the United Kingdom have come
down. The decline has been larger than that seen in the United States, but signiﬁcantly smaller
than the decline in the tax rate on U.K. corporate distributions.
King and Fullerton (1984) report an average tax rate of 47.7 percent in the 1960s. Based on
27data from the U.K. Inland Revenue Statistics, we estimate an average tax rate of 30.7 percent over
the period 1990–2001. Thus, although it has come down, the rate on corporate income has been
much higher than that on distributions for most of the period we study.
Subsidies to capital investment
In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, the main subsidies to capital investment are
through corporate grants for the purchase of new capital goods and tax allowances for depreciation.
Investment grants were paid to U.K. corporations starting in 1967. According to King and
Fullerton (1984), all investment in manufacturing, construction, and extractive industries automat-
ically qualiﬁed for grants until 1970. Using data from the U.K. Central Statistical Oﬃce (1971), we
estimate that grants were 12.7 percent of total corporate investment expenditures in 1969. With
the Industry Act of 1972, there was a shift to more discretionary assistance in order to encourage
development in certain regions, and by 1988 automatic grants were closed to new applications. For
the period 1990–2001, we ﬁnd that investment grants were small, averaging only 0.8 percent of
corporate investment.
The larger U.K. subsidies were tax allowances for depreciation. Throughout the 1970s, the
U.K. system had increasingly generous depreciation allowances. Inland Revenue Statistics reports
that between March 1972 and March 1984, immediate expensing was allowed on all investment in
machinery and plant and second-hand plant and ships. Starting in March 1972, industrial buildings
received an initial allowance of 40 percent. By 1981, the allowance was up to 75 percent. Inventories
received tax relief due to the high inﬂation in the 1970s. King and Fullerton (1984) estimate that
the tax relief was so generous that it is appropriate to assume immediate expensing on the purchases
of inventories.
These tax allowances were not unexpected policies; according to King and Robson (1993),
depreciation allowances had been getting more and more generous. The introduction of such
measures—especially if coupled with corporate tax rates as high as the United Kingdom had—
imply a very signiﬁcant fall in equity prices.
28Table 4. U.S. and U.K. Tax Rates, Capital Stocks, and Foreign Profits
U.S. U.K.
1960-69 1990-2001 1960-69 1990-2001
Tax Rates
Corporate Proﬁts
End of period 45.0 34.9 43.1 28.9
Average 43.2 35.3 47.7 30.7
Corporate Dividends
End of period 41.8 17.3 46.9 3.9
Average 41.1 17.4 49.1 −5.3
Investment subsidy
End of period 2.2 0.0 12.7 1.2
Average 2.0 0.0 3.1 0.8
Capital Stocks a
Domestic tangible .99 1.03 1.23 1.45
Domestic intangible .71 .65 .66 .51
Foreign/Domestic Profits .11 .29 .04 .29
aValues are relative to GDP. U.K. tangible stocks in the 1960s are available 1960–66.
B. Predictions of Theory
We turn now to quantifying the eﬀects of the changes in U.K. policies outlined above and
comparing the results with those for the United States and with the predictions of our growth
model. We focus on two particular observations for the value of U.K. corporations relative to
GDP: (i) it nearly tripled between 1960 and 2001, and (ii) it nearly halved between 1960 and 1975,
with both changes due primarily to movements in equity values relative to GDP. In this section,
we show that changes in U.K. tax and regulatory policies are the critical factors for changes in
U.K. corporate valuations.
The rise in equity values between 1960 and 2001
We start by comparing the 1960s with the period 1990–2001. In Table 4, we report our
estimates for the tax rates, capital stocks, and ratio of foreign to domestic proﬁts. For the purpose
of comparison, we do this for both the United States and the United Kingdom. These are the
29relevant statistics for evaluating the formula (29).
We reviewed changes in tax rates above, and here we summarize these changes by displaying
end-of-period values as well as averages in two periods: 1960–69 and 1990–2001. Relative to the
United States, the U.K. rates we compute show slightly less constancy within these periods—
especially the tax on corporate dividends in the later period and the investment subsidy in the
early period and—but there is a similar pattern across periods. For both countries, tax rates
on corporate proﬁts and subsidies on investment fell somewhat, and tax rates on dividends fell
dramatically.
Data on reproducible costs of tangible corporate assets are available from Roe (1971) for the
period 1957–66. Roe has estimates of dwellings, other land and buildings, plant and equipment,
and stocks and work in progress for U.K. corporations.25 In Table 4, we report for the 1960s an
average of 1.23 GDP, which is the average for 1960–66 using Roe’s data. This is higher than the
U.S. average of 0.99 GDP and may be due in part to higher corporate land values in the United
Kingdom.
Recent estimates of tangible capital are available in the U.K. ONS Blue Book 2002 since
1987. The ONS provides values for residential buildings, agricultural assets, commercial, industrial,
and other buildings, civil engineering works, plant and machinery, vehicles, and stocks and work in
progress. Its average for 1990–2001 for total corporate tangible capital is 1.45 GDP. Note that the
rise in corporate tangible capital is not negligible, as in the United States. The United Kingdom
had larger increases in subsidies and a greater decline in corporate income tax rates than the United
States.26 However, the diﬀerence between the reproducible cost of tangible capital in the 1960s
and the 1990s is only 0.22 GDP, much too small to account for the large increase in value shown
in Figure 2.
We also report in Table 4 estimates of intangible capital. Unfortunately, the procedure that
we use to estimate U.S. intangibles requires long and comparable time series for after-tax proﬁts,
tangible capital, growth rates, and depreciation rates. Consistent time series are not available for
the United Kingdom.
We do, however, have direct measures on U.S. and U.K. research and development expen-
ditures, which is a major component of intangible investment.27 We assume that R&D capital is
the same ﬁxed fraction of intangible stock in the two countries and thus use the ratio of U.K. to
30Table 5. Predicted and Actual U.S. and U.K. Corporate Values (Relative to GDP)
U.S. U.K.
1960-69 1990-2001 1960-69 1990-2001
Predicted Fundamental Values
Domestic tangible capital .563 .838 .572 1.320
Domestic intangible capital .229 .350 .200 .349
Foreign capital .086 .379 .031 .480
Total Relative to GDP .877 1.567 .802 2.148
Actual Market Values
Corporate equities .898 1.576 .773 1.845
Net corporate debt .071 .033 .035 .390
Total Relative to GDP .970 1.609 .808 2.235
U.S. investments in R&D and our estimate of intangible investment to infer a value for U.K. total
intangible investment. Assuming similar rates of accumulation, we can use the ratio of investments
as our ratio of the intangible capital stocks.
The earliest year data are available for the United Kingdom is 1972, which we use for our
estimate of U.K. intangible capital in the 1960s. In 1972, nondefense R&D was 1.50 percent of GDP
in the United Kingdom and 1.62 percent of GDP in the United States. Our estimate of intangible
capital for the United States is 0.71 GDP. Thus, our estimate of intangible capital for the United
Kingdom is (0.71 × U.S. GDP) (1.5 × U.K. GDP) / (1.62 × U.S. GDP) or 0.66 × U.K. GDP.
Doing the same, for the later period, our estimate is 0.51 × GDP.
To estimate the capital in foreign subsidiaries, we follow the same procedure that we used
for the United States. The last row of Table 4 shows the ratio of foreign to domestic proﬁts after
tax. These ratios are derived from national accounts.28 We use these ratios as our estimate of the
ratio of capital in foreign subsidiaries to capital at home.
The values in Table 4 are the elements we need to evaluate our key formula (29) for the
value of U.K. corporations. In Table 5, we report the predictions along with the actual market
values of corporate equities plus net debt. In order to allow for a direct comparison, we show the
results for both countries. The main ﬁnding of the table is that changes in taxes account for most
31of the increase in corporate valuations that occurred between the 1960s and the end of the 20th
century. The actual value of U.S. corporations increased by a factor of 1.66, and the model predicts
an increase of 1.79. The actual value of U.K. corporations increased by a factor of 2.76, and the
model predicts an increase of 2.67. For both countries and both time periods, the model slightly
underpredicts the level of the total value of corporations. But in all cases, the diﬀerence is less
than 10 percent. Thus, the theory correctly predicts a larger increase in the value of corporations
in the United Kingdom than in the United States.
The low equity values in the 1970s
Next we consider the eﬀects of changes in tax policies on U.K. valuations in the 1970s.
U.K. equity values were on average about 0.77 GDP in the 1960s and only 0.37 GDP in the second
half of the 1970s. Some of this decline was oﬀset by a rise in the value of net corporate debt.
Using balance sheet data, which is reported for the ﬁrst time by the ONS in their Blue Book 1987,
we estimate that net corporate debt averaged 0.089 GDP over the period 1975–79. This indicates
a slight increase in the value of net debt relative to levels in the 1960s, but the total value of
U.K. corporations still suﬀered a large decline, falling from an average of 0.808 in the 1960s to
0.459 in the second half of the 1970s.
An important change for the United Kingdom in this period is the increase in the rate
of capital subsidies. Recall that expenditures on plant, machinery, and inventories were allowed
immediate expensing during 1972–84, and by 1981, industrial buildings received an initial allowance
of 75 percent, with writing down allowances in the period of expenditure. Thus, the United Kingdom
was close to the extreme case with ˆ δ1x = 1 in equation (28). In that case, the rate of the subsidy,
τδ, is equal to the rate of the corporate income tax, τ1.
To see how important this policy is quantitatively, consider redoing the calculations of Table
5 for the United Kingdom in the 1960s, changing only the value of τδ from 0 to 43.1 percent, which
is the corporate income tax rate. Our prediction for the fundamental value of productive capital
with the higher rate of investment subsidies would be 0.493 GDP. This is very close to the actual
market value of 0.459 GDP that we calculated for the period 1975–79.
To get a more precise theoretical estimate, however, would require taking into account the
expectations of corporations and shareholders and the interaction of changes of the tax system at
the corporate and individual level. Two changes occurring in the early 1970s were the introduction
32of capital subsidies and the reintroduction of the imputation system. Capital subsidies depress the
price of capital, and lower taxes on dividends increase the price of capital.
Bond et al. (1996) provide evidence that suggests that the rise in the price of capital due
to lower taxes on dividends should not have occurred immediately. In fact, they show that the
dividend payout ratio actually fell after 1973. Between 1963 and 1973, the dividend payout ratio
averaged 29 percent. Between 1974 and 1984, the ratio averaged 13 percent. Bond et al. cite
two reasons for this. First, there were controls on dividends between 1972 and 1979. Second, the
generous capital subsidies implied that many companies were in a surplus ACT position, with a lot
of the ACT irrecoverable. Hence, they faced a lower imputation if they paid dividends.
In summary, we ﬁnd that increased tax subsidies are a quantitatively important factor for
the low U.K. equity values in the 1970s, accounting for almost all of the diﬀerence in corporate
valuations between the 1960s and 1970s. The subsidies were greater in the United Kingdom than in
the United States, which accounts for the fact that equity values were lower in the United Kingdom
than the United States.
5. The Long Transition in the 1980s and 1990s
By the late 1980s, the major tax reforms that occurred in the United States and the United
Kingdom had already been enacted. Not until the late 1990s did corporate equity values reach
their peaks. (See Figure 2.) In this section, we use a version of the model of Section 2, with just
one type of capital, to show that a long transition is reasonable in light of the constraints that
U.S. and U.K. shareholders faced on their asset holdings in tax-deferred retirement accounts.
To demonstrate the consequences of tax-deferred savings plans for stock prices, we deter-
mine the equilibrium path for the economy if such a tax-deferred plan is adopted. If there are
no constraints on contributions to retirement accounts and all contributions are tax deductible,
then the price of corporate equity would jump from 1 − τdist to 1 immediately, where τdist is the
personal income tax rate on corporate distributions through dividends or capital gains. If there are
constraints, then the price of corporate capital would not jump.
We denote the fraction of total wage income that can be put into a tax-deferred retirement
account by φ. Shares sr,t in the retirement account evolve according to
sr,t+1 =m a x{sr,t +( dtsr,t + φwt)/vt,1} (32)
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Figure 3. The Adjustment Path for the Price of Capital
with sr,0 =0 ,w h e r ewt is total wages. The diﬀerence equation governing the value of corporate
capital is summarized as follows:29
vt =( 1 − τdist)kt+1, for 1 ≤ t<t ∗
1 (33)
vt =
 
1+
i
1 − τdist
 
vt−1 − dt, for t∗
1 ≤ t ≤ t∗
2 (34)
vt = kt+1, for t>t ∗
2. (35)
Dividends are equal to dt =( i − g)kt,w h e r ei is the real interest rate and g is the growth rate of
the economy. We have assumed here that all capital is tangible.
Consider the following parameterization of the model economy. The time period is one
year. The aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas with the labor share equal to 0.68. The
aggregate capital stock is 3.0 GDP; here, we have only one sector. The rate of interest is 4.1
percent, and the economy grows at a rate of 3 percent. The tax rate on distributions is 42 percent.
Investors are allowed to put 10 percent of their wages into the retirement account starting at time
period 0.
Figure 3 plots the model’s equilibrium adjustment path for the price of capital q = v/k.A s
34the ﬁgure shows, that path is long, nearly 25 years. There is also an initial 4-year period in which
the price stays at 1 − τdist.
A well-calibrated overlapping generations model is needed to be more precise about the
actual length of the adjustment path. (See Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) for a recent survey of
the literature.)30 However, this example does establish that the adjustment path will be long. This
is consistent with the behavior of both U.S. and U.K. equity prices from the early 1980s to the
late 1990s, when tax laws favored tax-deferred retirement accounts and participation in those plans
increased dramatically.
6. Summary
Here we have derived the prediction of growth theory—the standard tool of macroeconomics
and public ﬁnance—for the value of U.S. and U.K. corporations in the period 1960–2001. Given
the changes in tax and regulatory policy during this period, the theory predicts that both coun-
tries should have experienced dramatic declines in corporate valuations in the 1970s and dramatic
increases starting in the 1980s and continuing through the 1990s. Both did. We also ﬁnd that
predicted and actual valuations are close in magnitude, indicating that the tax system is a quanti-
tatively important factor for the large, secular movements we observed.
We have focused on secular movements of corporate valuations. A puzzle that is as yet
unsolved is the higher-frequency volatility in the stock market, which is unlikely to be the result
of persistent changes in tax rates and regulations. Time-varying discount rates can induce large
variation in prices for relatively smooth sequences of dividends. However, values of corporate
capital stocks do not vary enough to justify the enormous variation in stock prices. Since the value
of capital is itself equal to the discounted stream of dividends, adding stochastic discount rates
only leads to counterfactual predictions for the value of the capital stock. Thus, the challenge
for macroeconomists and ﬁnancial economists is to ﬁnd theories consistent with both the data on
macro aggregates, like capital stocks, and the data on ﬁnancial aggregates, like the market value
of corporate equities.
We have focused on a dynastic economy and predictions of theory for the various tax regimes
in place in the United States and the United Kingdom during the post–World War II period. We
have established that changes in tax policy have been important for corporate valuations in both
countries. However, our framework is poorly suited for modeling the transition period following a
35major tax reform. A well-calibrated overlapping generations model, one that matches micro obser-
vations on household behavior, is needed to determine the quantitative nature of the equilibrium
path during transitions.
Allowing for heterogeneous individuals will also help quantify the eﬀects of increased market
participation and diversiﬁcation that has occurred in the past two decades. Until very recently,
mutual funds were a very expensive method of creating a diversiﬁed equity portfolio. Abstracting
from diversiﬁcation costs has only a modest eﬀect on the total value of corporations, but could
have a more important eﬀect on estimates of the equity returns of mutual fund shareholders. Our
work in McGrattan and Prescott (2003a) suggests that these eﬀects are large.
36Appendix. Proof of Proposition 3
Here we prove Proposition 3, which expresses the total value of corporate equity in equation (27)
and the rate of subsidies to corporate tangible investment in (28) when an economy is on a balanced-
growth path.
Proof: Use (16) and (17) to replace x1m,t and x1u,t, respectively, in the corporate ﬁrm’s problem.
The maximization problem then is to maximize (23) subject to
(1 + η)k1m,t+1 − (1 − δ1m)k1m,t =[ ( 1+η)(1 + π)ˆ k1m,t+1 − (1 − ˆ δ1m)ˆ k1m,t]/(1 − ˆ δ1x). (A1)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the ﬁrm with respect to k1m,t+1, ˆ k1m,t+1,a n dk1u,t+1 are that
(1 + η)
pt
pt+1
=
(1 − τ1)(p1,t+1fc
1,t+1 − τ1k)
1 − τx − τ1ˆ δ1x − λt
+( 1− δ1m)
 
1 − τx − τ1ˆ δ1x − λt+1
1 − τx − τ1ˆ δ1x − λt
 
(A2)
(1 + η)
pt
pt+1
=
 
λt+1
λt
(1 − ˆ δ1m)
(1 − ˆ δ1x)
+ τ1
ˆ δ1m
λt
  
1 − ˆ δ1x
1+π
 
(A3)
(1 + η)
pt
pt+1
= p1,t+1fc
2,t+1 +1− δ1u (A4)
where λt is the multiplier on (A1) normalized by pt and fc
j,t is the partial derivative of the corporate
production function with respect to its jth argument.
From the household’s problem, we derive that
pt
pt+1
=
v1s,t+1 +( 1− τd)d1,t+1
v1s,t
(A5)
which relates the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution to the gross return on equity.
Multiply (A2) by (1−τx −τ1ˆ δ1x −λt)k1m,t+1,( A 3 )b yλt(1+π)/(1−ˆ δ1x)ˆ k1m,t+1,a n d( A 4 )
by (1 − τ1)k1u,t+1; sum up terms, and multiply both sides by 1 − τd. The resulting equation is
consistent with (A5) if and only if
v1s,t =( 1 −τd)(1+η)
 
(1−τx−τ1ˆ δ1x−λt)k1m,t+1+λt
1+π
1−ˆ δ1x
ˆ k1m,t+1+(1− τ1)k1u,t+1
 
. (A6)
37We now show that on a balanced-growth path,
(1 − τx − τ1ˆ δ1x − λ)k1m,t+1 + λ(1 + π)/(1 − ˆ δ1x)ˆ k1m,t+1 =( 1− τx − τδ)k1m,t+1 (A7)
where τδ is deﬁned as follows:
τδ = τ1ˆ δ1x + λ − λ(1 + π)
(1 + η)(1 + γ) − 1+δ1m
(1 + η)(1 + γ)(1 + π) − 1+ˆ δ1m
. (A8)
On a balanced-growth path, the real interest rate is equal to (1+η)pt/pt+1 −1. Using (A3),
we have that
λ =
τ1ˆ δ1m(1 − ˆ δ1x)
(1 + i)(1 + π) − 1+ˆ δ1m
. (A9)
Using (A1), we have that
ˆ k1m,t+1 =
 
[(1 + η)(1 + γ) − 1+δ1m](1 − ˆ δ1x)
(1 + η)(1 + γ)(1 + π) − 1+ˆ δ1m
 
k1m,t+1. (A10)
Substituting (A9) and (A10) into the left side of (A7) gives the expression (28) for τδ. Substituting
(A7) into (A6) gives the expression (27) for the equity price.
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1The source for the data graphed in Figure 1 are the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States. A detailed description of the data used in this study is available in McGrattan
and Prescott (2003b).
2This phrase was used by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (1996).
3An early dynamic general equilibrium model with corporate equity prices is Lucas and
Prescott’s (1971). Hayashi (1982) extends and applies their structure.
4It turns out that the large run-up in equity values was not due to a change in ﬁnancing
decisions. In both the 1960s and the 1990s, net corporate debt was low relative to equity.
5Here we abstract from all forms of heterogeneity in individuals. We view this as a ﬁrst step
toward understanding the interaction of stock values and the U.S. tax system. Obvious extensions
would allow for individuals of diﬀerent ages, incomes, and abilities. See, for example, Alvarez and
Jermann (2001) and Constantinides et al. (2002).
6Because of our emphasis on taxation as a key factor for postwar asset prices, we analyze
a production economy. See also the work of Donaldson and Mehra (1984), Rouwenhorst (1995),
Jermann (1998), and Hall (2001), who study asset pricing in production economies.
7See, for example, King (1977), Summers (1981), Auerbach (1983a, 2002), and Poterba
(2002). There are two alternative views in the ﬁnance literature which imply that the value of
corporate equity is equal to the reproducible cost of capital. See Poterba and Summers (1985) for
a clear exposition of these views.
8Here pension funds include annuities provided by life insurance companies.
9Buybacks were of greater importance in 1972 and 1973, but this is because a ceiling on
dividends had been imposed during Nixon’s Economic Stabilization Program.
10For example, only one broker or dealer can be employed on any day to buy stocks; the
corporation cannot perform the opening trade or trade during 30 minutes prior to market close;
the buybacks cannot exceed a speciﬁc volume; and the corporation cannot reacquire its stock at a
price or bid exceeding the highest independent bid.
11The main data sources are U.S. Department of Commerce (1929–2002), U.S. Department of
the Treasury (1955–2000), Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1945–2002), Feenberg and Coutts
(1993), and the Investment Company Institute (2003).
12In the 1986 TRA, this average was increased by a factor of 1.4. See King and Fullerton
(1984), Tables 6-5 and 6-29, and Fullerton and Karayannis (1993), Table 10-7.
13Our corporate sector includes both publicly traded and privately held corporations. See
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for a comparison of publicly and nonpublicly traded com-
panies.
14Because quantities in the budget constraint are in per-capita terms, pt is the intertemporal
household price of consumption multiplied by the population in t. The rate of interest between t
and t + 1 is therefore given by (pt/Nt)/(pt+1/Nt+1) − 1o r( 1+η)pt/pt+1 − 1.
15For this comparison, we assume that book capital and market capital are close in value and
set τδ equal to zero. In our analysis of the 1970s, we assume that sustained inﬂation and generous
depreciation allowances led to a signiﬁcant increase in τδ.
16In McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2001) we use returns from the noncorporate sector as
our measure of i and ﬁnd similar results. Two diﬃcult choices must be made when computing
noncorporate returns: (1) how to allocate net interest to ﬁnal and intermediate product; and (2)
how to allocate proprietor’s income to capital and labor. Using growth rates and discount factors
here, we avoid having to make these choices.
17The investment ﬁgures are taken from Table F6. We sum across all corporate categories and
39assume that 10 percent of farm business is corporate.
18Some estimates in the literature assume that the diﬀerence between stock values and tangible
capital stock values is the value of intangible capital. See, for example, Hall (2001). We do not want
to assume a priori that the large run-up in equity values is due to a rise in the value of intangibles.
19As we show later, the transition period following the 1986 TRA was slow. For this reason,
we compare the model predictions to averages for the period 1998–2001, when prices reached a
higher plateau.
20Following Hall (2001), we adjust the values of average net debt from the Fed’s Flow of Funds
Accounts because they report book values rather than market values.
21Baxter and Jermann (1997) ﬁnd that individuals are not well diversiﬁed internationally. But
signiﬁcant diversiﬁcation occurs through capital holdings of foreign subsidiaries.
22If π = 0, our estimate of τδ would be 0.19. Thus, we ﬁnd that τδ is not necessarily increasing
in π and the eﬀects are much smaller than Feldstein (1980) estimates.
23This is consistent with Auerbach’s (1983b) estimates of approximately 20 percent for the
investment subsidies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See his Table 12.
24The equity values shown in Figure 2 are net of intercorporate holdings and relative to
GDP. The main sources for the U.K. series are Stone et al. (1966), Revell (1967), Moyle (1971),
Roe (1971), U.K. Central Statistical Oﬃce (CSO) (1979), Stock Exchange (1982), U.K. Oﬃce for
National Statistics (ONS) Share Ownership (1994, 1997–2002), London Stock Exchange (2002),
ONS Blue Book 2002,a n dO N SPink Book 2002. See McGrattan and Prescott (2003b) for further
details on these data. We plot equity values rather than total corporate values in Figure 2 because
we do not have a comparable net debt values for all years for the United Kingdom.
25We include only subsectors of nonﬁnancial companies and ﬁnancial institutions that issue
U.K. quoted or unquoted ordinary shares.
26Another reason for higher capital stocks in the United Kingdom across time is coverage:
ONS includes unincorporated enterprises while Roe (1971) does not.
27The estimates in Table 4 for the United Kingdom are based on data of the National Sci-
ence Foundation (1953–2002). The NSF reports nondefense R&D expenditures as a percentage of
national GDP.
28The United Kingdom has recently revised its accounting methods to be consistent with
European standards. We use the earlier ONS Blue Book 1997, which provides details we need on
trading proﬁts. See our data appendix in McGrattan and Prescott (2003b) for details.
29The diﬀerential equations governing sr and v are ˙ sr =( dsr + φw)/v and
˙ v =
i
1 − τdist
v − d (†)
in the range that v is increasing. Equation (†) is required for an individual to be indiﬀerent
between buying a share today and selling it tomorrow. The value of v/k either starts out at a
number exceeding (1 − τdist)o ri s( 1− τdist) for some time interval of length t∗
1.T h e ni to b e y s( †)
until v/k =1 . F o rt ≥ t∗
2, v/k = 1. The equilibrium curve is the one for which sr(t∗
2)=1 . N o t e
that sr(0) = 0.
30With an overlapping generations model, initially retirees will be selling more shares than are
being bought by the retirement accounts, and some people near retirement will be buying shares
for their personal account. At some point, the sales of old people will be equal to the purchases of
the retirement accounts, and then the price of corporate capital will be 1. At a price of 1, there will
be some workers on the margin between contributing a little more or a little less to their retirement
accounts and some retired people on the margin between selling or buying a few more shares.
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